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CONSUMER PROTECTION CHOICE OF LAW:
EUROPEAN LESSONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES
JAMES J. HEALY*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the choice-of-law analysis of consumer
contracts is governed generally by the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws. According to §187, the “chosen law” in a contract
will be applied unless the application of that law would violate a
1
fundamental public policy of that state. Unfortunately, American
courts applying this method have produced inconsistent
2
interpretations of consumer contracts, since not all courts have been
willing to use the public policy exception to offer consumers the
protections of the laws of their home state. The United States would
be well served to look at Europe’s example of consumer contract
interpretation to develop a more uniform and consistent legal
approach that honors the protections of consumers’ home state laws.
Under Council Regulation 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome I), consumers in Europe are
permitted to select the applicable law of a contract, to the extent that
the protections under the selected law do not derogate from the
protections of the laws of their home jurisdiction.3 Adopting this
approach in the United States would not only further the goals of
protecting consumers in America but would also encourage consumer
confidence in cross-border transactions. In addition, such a change
would provide U.S. courts with a straightforward choice-of-law model

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2009; A.B. Cornell University, 2006. I would
like to thank Professor Ralf Michaels for introducing me to this topic and for his guidance
throughout the writing process. In addition, I very much appreciate the editing assistance from
the editors of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. All remaining errors are
my own. Special thanks to my family for their love and support.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) (EC) [hereinafter Rome I
Regulation].
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that encourages consistency and reliability in judicial interpretations
of choice-of-law provisions in consumer contracts.
Part I of this note explores consumer protection choice-of-law in
America under §187. The selected cases illustrate the inconsistency of
the application of home-state protections to consumer litigants in
U.S. courts. Part II examines the European conflicts approach for
consumer contracts to help understand the benefits and drawbacks of
the Rome I approach. Finally, in part III, this Note analyzes whether
a new American approach based on the European model would offer
a more predictable and consistent methodology for interpreting
choice-of-law provisions in consumer contracts.
I. AMERICAN COURTS HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT IN
PROTECTING CONSUMERS BY ENFORCING THE LAWS OF
THEIR HOME STATES
Though not always applied with the same degree of uniformity,
American courts examining the “public policy” exception sometimes
look to the same goal as European system: protecting consumers
from a choice of law that is detrimental to the protections their home
4
jurisdiction’s laws and customs allow. Under the Second Restatement
of Conflict of Laws § 187(2), the state law chosen by the parties to
govern a contract will be applied unless the selected state lacks a
“substantial relationship” to the parties or the transaction or the
application of the chosen state’s law “would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state . . . which, under § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.”5 Similarly, prior to the 2001 revisions,6 the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) permitted parties to a transaction to
select the law of any state or nation to which the transaction “bears a
7
reasonable relation.”

4. See infra Parts I.B, I.C.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1)-(2) (1971).
6. This aspect of choice of law for American consumers has been the subject of attempted
reforms to adopt a more European approach. See infra Part III. For the new section which
replaced U.C.C. § 1-105, see U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(1) (2003).
7. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1977).
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At its core, § 187 aims to protect both consumer and state
8
interests. The Restatement provides that “chosen law should not be
applied without regard for the interests of the state which would be
the state of the applicable law . . . in the absence of an effective choice
9
by the parties.” These state interests affect consumer interests
because the “[p]rime objectives of contract law are to protect the
justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them
to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities under
the contract.”10 Thus, the Restatement uses the interests of the state
as means to protect the expectations of contracting parties.
However, some American courts have not followed these
principles embodied in the Restatement. In particular, parties to an
agreement have not been able to “foretell with accuracy”11 their rights
and protections under contract, since some American courts have
given consumers the protection of the laws of their home state while
others have denied such protections to similarly-situated consumers.
Section A below examines the general application of the
fundamental public policy exception. Sections B and C examine the
inconsistent application of this exception in applying the home state
protections for consumers in the areas of class action waivers and
credit card contracts, respectively. These examples are particularly
pertinent because a substantial amount of jurisprudence exists in
these two areas, which constitute a growing portion of cross-border
transactions involving American consumers. These specific examples
are indicative of the larger problem with American consumer
conflicts law, namely that consumers are not treated consistently
under the fundamental public policy exception.
A. General Application of Fundamental Public Policy Exception
If an American court finds that a choice of law violates a
fundamental public policy, the Restatement empowers the court to
decline to apply the chosen law.12 However, the scope of the public
policy exception has not been interpreted on a consistent basis. While
some U.S. courts have referred to the fundamental public policy
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (“Fulfillment of the
parties' expectations is not the only value in contract law; regard must also be had for state
interest and for state regulation.”).
9. Id.
10. Id. cmt. e.
11. Id.
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.
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exception of §187(2) as “broad,”13 other courts have taken the
opposite approach, applying the exception only in “extremely
14
limited” circumstances. Since courts have divergent views regarding
the scope of the exception it is little wonder that they have produced
inconsistent results.
The standards used by courts to determine whether a policy is
fundamental are similarly vague. For example, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming looked to §187 and declared that it “[would] not apply
foreign law when it is contrary to the law, public policy, or the general
15
interests of Wyoming’s citizens.” This standard shows that the
criteria for whether a policy is a fundamental one can be vague and
inconsistent. Without further specificity, the “general interests” of a
state’s citizens will be of little assistance in guiding the choice-of-law
analysis toward a uniform application. For example, Wyoming’s high
court decided in favor of a defendant company and enforced the
chosen law of a contract, finding that no fundamental policies were
implicated simply because the laws of Wyoming and Pennsylvania
were “similar.”16 But the fundamental public policy exception is not
meant to serve as a proxy for similarity in state laws. The
Restatement provides that a difference in results of state laws should
not alone implicate the existence of a fundamental policy.17
Without a clear understanding of what constitutes a fundamental
policy and how the analysis should be conducted, consumers in
America will be unable to predict whether courts will apply the
chosen law of the contract. A consumer hoping for the protections of
their home jurisdiction’s laws must hope to find themselves before a
judge who sympathizes with their “general interests.”
B. Class Action Waivers in Consumer Contracts
When evaluating choice-of-law questions with regard to class
action waivers in consumer contracts, American courts have used
different justifications and rationales. These divergent approaches
have lead to a wide range of results, leaving only some consumers
with the protections of their home-state laws.

13. See Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 921 A.2d 799, 805 (Md. 2007).
14. See Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 332 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 933 P.2d 867 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)).
15. Resource Tech. Corp. v. Fisher, 924 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1996).
16. Id.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g.
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1. Fundamental Public Policy used to Protect Consumers
At the state and federal levels, some courts have undertaken
choice-of-law analyses that ensure consumers receive the protections
of their home states. However, even though these courts reach a
similar result, they often employ different justifications. In Aral v.
Earthlink,18 a California state appellate court applied California law to
allow for a private class action suit against an internet service
provider by its former customers. Since Earthlink’s principal place of
business was in Georgia, the court found that § 187 provided a
reasonable basis for the choice of Georgia law, which permitted the
waiver of class action suits in consumer contracts.19 However, the
court noted that class action waivers were frowned upon by the laws
20
and policies of California. In fact, the court went as far as to say that
the fundamental policy at issue was not only the right to pursue class
action remedies, but also “the right of California to ensure that its
citizens have a viable forum in which to recover minor amounts of
money allegedly obtained in violation of [state unfair competition
laws].”21 More specifically, the court said that the policy was
fundamental since application of the chosen law would act to deprive
consumers of any realistic opportunity to recover small sums that
were obtained by fraud.22 Thus, the court here afforded California
consumers the protection of the laws and policies of their native state,
even where the selection of another state’s laws would have been a
valid choice of law to govern the contract.
Yet, the court’s decision to protect consumers went further than
simply allowing consumers to rely on the laws of their home state.
This court explicitly relied on the right of the state itself to provide
for a process that allows its citizens to recover against unfair
competition on the part of a commercial seller.23 Presumably, the
choice-of-law analysis did not turn on a court merely selecting its own
public policy over that of another state but was influenced by the
pronouncement that a state could determine the minimum
protections that it would afford its citizens when they act as
consumers in an interstate transaction.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

134 Cal. App. 4th 544 (Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 554-57.
Id. at 564.
Id.
See id.
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The same court in California was presented with another class
action waiver choice-of-law question in Klussman v. Cross Country
24
Bank and again resolved the question in favor of the consumer’s
home-state laws.25 In refusing to enforce the class action waiver
provision in a consumer contract with a national company, the court
held that the right to seek redress as a class was “more than a mere
procedural device in California” and that the rejection of class action
waivers in California was based on public policy expressions against
that practice in state statutes.26 The court pointed to many
justifications in favor of class-action consumer litigation, including
facilitating efficient consumer recovery from fraudulent business
practices, assisting lawful businesses by curtailing unscrupulous
competitors, and consolidating the litigation of multiple identical
claims.27 Thus, the prohibition of class actions, which function as
procedural mechanisms that benefit the entire court system, was
interpreted to be in violation of “fundamental fairness and public
policy.”28
However, this court went further than simply looking to state
consumer protection laws. Instead, the court offered an additional
rationale in support of protecting class claimants – the orderly
functioning of the judicial system. By declining to enforce the
provision on the grounds that it violated a fundamental public policy,
the court not only afforded the consumer the statutory protections of
their home jurisdiction but also the benefits obtained from the
underlying goals of these protections, specifically the ability to
recover against fraudulent commercial sellers.
Other courts have employed different justifications in choice of
law analyses that offer consumers the protection of their home state
laws. When faced with a class action waiver in a telephone contract
that would have been valid under New York law, the Supreme Court
of Washington refused to enforce the contract on the grounds of
29
fundamental public policy. The court recognized that the question of
whether a class action waiver amounted to a fundamental public
policy was a different inquiry than whether such a waiver was

24. 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
25. See id. at 1300.
26. Id. at 1296.
27. Id. at 1294 (quoting American Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001)).
28. Id. at 1295.
29. See McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 852 (Wash. 2008).
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substantively unconscionable.30 In examining previous cases applying
the state’s Consumer Protection Act, Washington’s high court found
that the policy favoring adjudication of small claims in the class
context was a fundamental one.31 Yet this court based its decision not
on state statute alone but also on general concepts of consumer
protection. The court reasoned that “protecting parties in a position
of weaker bargaining power from exploitation” is the type of
32
fundamental public policy that is implicated by § 187. In essence, the
underlying motivation for the state law—here, the protection of the
weaker party in a consumer transaction—formed the basis for
concluding that the state’s policy against class action waivers
amounted to a fundamental rule.
Examples where American courts provided consumers with the
protections and policies of their home states are not limited to state
33
courts. In Douglas v. District Court, customers filed a class action
lawsuit in federal court to challenge a phone company’s attempt to
34
alter the terms of the contract unilaterally. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested that the customers could not
be subjected to the revised terms of the contract, in part because the
revised agreement would be unconscionable in California and thus
contrary to that state’s fundamental public policy.35 The court relied
upon California decisions that rejected the idea that alternative
service options could provide the sole grounds to survive a claim for
unconscionability of a contract.36 Since a class action waiver could be
unconscionable under California law, this court found that the
availability of other services would not foreclose the action brought
by the class claimants.37 As in the above cases discussing class action
waivers, the Ninth Circuit in Douglas applied the home-state
protections to consumers on the basis of both the applicable laws of
their home jurisdictions and the closely held principle that the
availability of substitute services should not insulate otherwise unfair
commercial arrangements.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
banc)).
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007).
See id. at 1066.
See id. at 1067.
Id. at 1068 (citing Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
See id.
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2. Courts Decline to Protect Consumers through Fundamental
Public Policy
Notwithstanding the above examples, courts in other cases have
not found that class action waivers constitute a fundamental public
policy and have declined to extend home-state protections to the
consumers who brought suit. One example is Discover Bank v.
38
Superior Court, where a consumer contested the decision by the
credit card company to amend the terms of the agreement and add a
class action waiver to the contract.39 That court sought guidance from
the state’s highest court, which directed that when such a waiver was
present in a consumer contract of adhesion where one party with
greater bargaining power “has carried out a scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers . . . such waivers are
unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.”40
Despite this pronouncement, however, the lower court decided that
41
the substantive law of Delaware should apply.
Discover Bank was decided within about a week of both Aral
42
and Klussman by the very same court. While the latter two cases
relied on the unconscionability of class action waivers and applied
California law to protect home state consumers, the same court in
Discover Bank took an entirely different course of action. The stated
reason for this departure was that the single plaintiff in Discover
Bank, as opposed to the class represented by the plaintiffs in both
Aral and Klussman, was asserting claims on the basis of Delaware
laws and on behalf of consumers everywhere, instead of just
California residents.43 Although the plaintiff in Discover Bank was
also a resident of the state of California, the court thought less of the
wide-ranging policies—the orderly administration of justice in
California courts, the availability of claims for consumers who fall
victim to fraud, and the need for the state to create a viable forum for
consumers to recover against unfair competition—espoused in Aral
and Klussman as the basis for those decisions. The fact that the same
court within such a short span of time decided similar cases
differently demonstrates the inconsistency of the approach. When

38. 134 Cal. App. 4th 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
39. Id. at 889.
40. Id. at 894.
41. Id.
42. Aral was decided on November 29, 2005, Klussman on December 15, 2005, and
Discover Bank on December 7, 2005.
43. See Discover Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 895.
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similarly situated claimants receive different protections from the
same court under the fundamental public policy analysis, the logical
conclusion is that a more predictable choice-of-law approach is
necessary.
C. Credit Card Agreements
The inconsistency in choice-of-law analysis in class action waivers
is also present in the treatment of credit card agreements in American
courts. Many states have taken steps to regulate credit card
agreements and practices in order to shield consumers from unfair
business practices.44 As a result, this area of the law is an important
aspect of consumer protection in the United States. As with class
action waivers, American courts have sometimes protected
consumers by applying the laws of their home states. However, courts
have also failed to extend this protection to similarly situated
claimants on other occasions.
1. Fundamental Public Policy used to Protect Consumers
On some occasions, courts have interpreted the fundamental
public policy exception to protect consumers by applying the laws of
their home states. For example, in Coady v. Cross Country Bank,45
cardholders challenged a credit card company for illegal debt
collection practices, including allegations of threats, harassing phone
calls, and obscene language by the company’s representatives.46
Though the plaintiffs were residents of Wisconsin, the agreement
47
provided for Delaware law to govern the contract. The Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin decided that statutory protections afforded to
state residents under the Wisconsin Consumer Act amounted to an
important public policy.48 The court invalidated this contract in part
because the choice-of-law provision in the agreement effectively
prevented the plaintiffs from asserting any of the protections, claims,
49
or remedies that Wisconsin law provided to them. The choice-of-law
clause was coupled with an arbitration clause, which the court viewed

44. See Jeffrey I. Langer & Kathleen E. Keest, Interest Rate Regulation Developments in
1995: Continuing Liberalization of State Credit Card Laws and “Non-Filing” Insurance as
“Interest” Under State Usury Laws, 51 BUS. LAW. 887 (1996).
45. 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
46. Id. at 736.
47. See id. at 735-36.
48. See id. at 737.
49. See id. at 739.
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as a device to limit the substantive laws applicable to any consumer
50
claim to those of Delaware and federal law only. This limitation on
the type of relief available to consumers seemed to be a strong
motivation in this court’s choice of law decision.
In sum, the problem with this choice-of-law provision was not
that the chosen law (Delaware) contained provisions which ran
contrary to a fundamental public policy of Wisconsin. Instead, the
court decided that the fundamental policy implicated in this dispute
was Wisconsin’s consumer protection scheme to protect its residents
from unfair lending practices.51
2. Courts Decline to Protect Consumers through Fundamental
Public Policy
However, not all courts have used the fundamental public policy
exception to protect consumers in credit card contract disputes.
Unlike Coady, where the Wisconsin court assumed that the mere
52
existence of a statute constituted a fundamental public policy, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables,
53
Inc. decided that the fundamental public policy question regarding
credit card holders turned on whether a consumer protection statute
54
could constitute a fundamental public policy. The Maryland court
determined that the existence of a similar statute did not create a
fundamental public policy.55 Maryland state law imposed several
restraints on credit card companies, including requiring the signature
of the cardholder, limiting the maximum allowable interest rate, and
requiring that certain information be disclosed to the cardholder.56 In
Jackson, the plaintiff contended that the card issuer had violated the
applicable Maryland laws by failing to make a reasonable attempt to
obtain her signature on the agreement.57 As the court considered
whether to apply Maryland law or the contract’s chosen law, South
Dakota, it looked to whether the Maryland law amounted to a

50. Id. at 740.
51. Id. at 740-41 (“The clause violates an important state public policy as embodied in the
Wisconsin Consumer Act because it bars the plaintiffs from asserting any claims or seeking any
remedies under the Act.”).
52. Id.
53. 921 A.2d 799 (Md. 2007).
54. See id. at 805.
55. See Jackson, 921 A.2d at 808.
56. Id. at 800.
57. Id. at 799.
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fundamental public policy.58 The court looked to its previous case law,
under which courts in Maryland applied a lex loci contractus
59
approach, and determined that the law did not constitute
fundamental public policy.60
Leaving aside the problems inherent in the court’s decision to
combine a conflicts analysis using both the Second Restatement and
lex loci, the Jackson case provides an example of the unpredictable
nature of the fundamental public policy exception. While a Wisconsin
consumer, like that in Coady, can rely on a state statutory consumer
protection initiative to protect her interests from a detrimental
chosen law, a Maryland consumer cannot. Instead, under Jackson, a
Maryland cardholder would benefit from the protection of her home
state’s laws only if the law on which she relied was one of enough
importance that her state’s courts would deem it to be fundamental.
Though the two statutes appear to function similarly in the different
states, one court decided it to be a fundamental policy while the other
did not. These differences among states, as well as the difficulty in
determining whether a law might rise to fundamental importance,
make relying on this choice-of-law approach problematic. Ultimately,
consumers are left to suffer from these unpredictable results.
The unpredictability in choice-of-law analysis of credit card
agreements is not limited to state courts. In Vigil v. Sears National
Bank,61 a consumer in Louisiana challenged the contract governing
her credit card agreement, which contained a choice-of-law provision
specifying that the contract had been entered into in Arizona and that
the laws of that state would govern.62 The plaintiff’s suit relied on
Louisiana state consumer law, which directed courts to invalidate
consumer credit transactions where the consumer consented to the
jurisdiction and fixed venue of another state,63 but the federal district
court determined that Louisiana’s laws did not allow for an
64
invalidation of this contractual provision. In another case, Gay v.
CreditInform, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
declined to offer a consumer the protections of his home-state laws

58. Id. at 805.
59. See id. (recognizing that the lex loci contractus approach will apply the law of the place
where the transaction occurred, unless that decision would be dangerous to public policy).
60. See id. at 808.
61. 205 F.Supp.2d 566 (E.D. La. 2002).
62. See id. at 569.
63. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3511(c) (2001)).
64. Id.
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against a credit card corporation.65 The Pennsylvania plaintiff alleged
that a branch of the Capital One credit card company had violated
66
Pennsylvania state credit repair regulations that gave consumers the
right to bring claims against a credit provider in a judicial forum.67
The contract’s arbitration provision was valid under the Virginia law
stipulated by the contract, and would prevent a consumer from
bringing the suit authorized under Pennsylvania law.68 Despite
recognizing that Pennsylvania had “an interest in protecting its
consumers,” the court determined that applying Virginia law, instead
of the law of the consumer’s home state, would not violate a
69
fundamental public policy of Pennsylvania. Thus, Vigil and Gay
provide two additional examples where courts have held that
statutory consumer protection regimes do not constitute fundamental
public policies. This inconsistency deprives consumers of the
predictability and confidence that is necessary to conduct crossborder transactions.
II: CONSUMER PROTECTION CHOICE OF LAW IN EUROPE:
POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED STATES
Generally, European courts will not enforce a law selection
clause if doing so would ignore the binding laws of the consumer’s
native jurisdiction. Though premised on the concept of choice, the
European choice-of-law rules, at their core, have aimed to protect the
weaker party in consumer transactions.70 In 1979, the European Court
of Justice in Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) overturned a German regulation
prohibiting the sale of drinks of a certain alcoholic content, implicitly
deciding that member states should mutually recognize the laws of
other states.71 This decision was later extended from production
standards to services and represents an obligation on states to
recognize foreign law, especially when that law concerns the country

65. See Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007).
66. Id. at 374.
67. Id. at 376.
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id.
70. See Dennis Solomon, The Private International Law of Contracts in Europe: Advances
and Retreats, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1717 (2008).
71. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis
de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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of origin of one of the parties.72 This development of the concept of
free movement influenced the European approach to permitting
consumer choice. While consumer choice became the “guiding
principle” of European consumer law,73 particular rules were
developed for some contracts where it was generally accepted that
one party to the contract required some level of additional
protection.74 The European development of specific contract laws in
the consumer protection context is one such area.
Section A below traces the development of the rules regarding
contractual obligations in Europe and the special approach taken to
consumer protection. Section B discusses the applications of Europe’s
choice-of-law approach. Finally, section C analyzes the criticisms and
possible shortcomings of the European rule.
A. Development of Europe’s Approach to Consumer Contracts
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
75
76
Obligations (Rome Convention) took effect within Europe in 1980.
The ability of parties to stipulate to a choice of law was one of the
basic rules of the Rome Convention, which explicitly states that “[a]
contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.”77 Yet the
extent of such choice was limited in some contexts, including those
relating to consumer transactions and employment contracts.78
Specifically, Article 5 provides that a selection could “not have the
result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by
the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his
habitual residence,” subject to requirement that the seller was
essentially doing business in that jurisdiction.79 In sum, the Rome
Convention showed that the importance of contractual choice in
Europe functioned only to an extent in the consumer protection

72. See Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV.
1607, 1626 (2008).
73. Gert Straetmans, The Consumer Concept in EC Law, in ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 295, 303 (Johan Meeusen, Marta
Pertegás & Gert Straetmans eds., 2004).
74. Solomon, supra note 70, at 1717.
75. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature
June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
76. Patrick J. Borchers, Categorical Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private International
Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1650 (2008).
77. Rome Convention, supra note 75, art. 3.
78. Id. arts. 5-6.
79. Id. art. 5.
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context. The rules governing consumer contracts provide a greater
degree of protection to consumers by limiting contractual choice so
that consumers cannot select a set of laws that would deprive them of
the protections of their home laws.80
As the Rome Convention gave way to the Rome I regulation,81
the various drafts of rules applicable to consumer contracts evinced
these concerns about balancing consumer choice with the protection
of the weaker party. Originally, the Rome I regulation guaranteed
consumers the protection of their home state laws by preventing them
82
from choosing a governing law for the contract. In the first proposed
draft of the regulation, the law applicable to consumer contracts in
Article 5(1) read: “Consumer contracts . . . shall be governed by the
law of the Member State in which the consumer has his habitual
residence.”83 This approach sought to strengthen the rights of
consumers and limit the ability of large companies to choose a
favorable set of laws and impose them across the European Union
through choice-of-law clauses in cross-border consumer contracts.84
The Rome I proposal also contained a habitual residence exception to
the mandatory home-state rules. The habitual residence requirement
applied where the professional seller pursues commercial activities in
that jurisdiction.85 A seller was only excused from this requirement if
it was unaware of the consumer’s home state and this lack of
86
knowledge was not the result of the seller’s own negligence.
In response to the initial Rome I proposal, the European
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) reviewed the first draft and
87
published a response. Regarding Article 5 and the proposed rules on
consumer contracts, the EESC described the new rules as “a
thorough reworking” and praised the regulations as a “step in the
80. Id.
81. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 3.
82. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), at 16, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec.
15, 2005) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
83. Id.
84. See Answer of Ms. Kuneva to Written Question: E-1751/2007, June 13, 2007, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2007-1751&language=EN.
85. See Commission Proposal, supra note 82, at 16.
86. See id. See also Answer of Ms. Kuneva to Written Question: E-1751/2007, supra note 84
(noting that this was the “only exception” to the rule that the law of the consumer’s habitual
residence must apply to consumer transactions).
87. See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome I), 2006 O.J. (C 318) 56.
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right direction.”88 The committee supported the idea of protecting
consumers by providing them with the protection of their home-state
laws, since such laws would likely be most familiar to consumers and
in their native language, and thus would make it easier to obtain legal
89
advice. However, the EESC questioned the wisdom of eliminating
all opportunities for the consumers to choose the laws governing
contracts.90 Instead, the committee believed that consumers would
benefit from the ability to select the applicable law, so long as
“certain protective measures” were in place to protect the party to the
transaction who is presumably less experienced and possesses weaker
91
bargaining power. The EESC urged subsequent revisions to the
Rome I proposal reflecting this recommendation.92
The European Parliament shared these concerns and suggested
93
to amend the Rome I regulations accordingly. In the amendments to
Article 5, the European Parliament proposed that 5(1) still require
that a commercial contract be “governed by the law of the country
where the consumer has his or her habitual residence.”94 But Article
5(2) was changed to allow parties to choose the law applicable to the
contract, so long as that choice would not “have the result of
depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by such
provisions that cannot be derogated from by contract by virtue of the
law which, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable on
the basis of [Article 5(1)].”95 These proposed changes were eventually
adopted and are reflected in the final text of the Rome I regulations.96
Thus, the legislative history of Rome I demonstrates that both
safeguarding consumer choice and protecting the weaker parties to
such transactions were the primary purposes behind the various drafts
of the consumer contracts rule. While consumer choice was seen as an
important freedom-of-contract principle, it was deemed essential in
the consumer contracts context that this freedom to select the
applicable law be coupled with certain protections. This approach
88. Id. § 3.3.1.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See Comm. on Legal Affairs, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Law Applicable to Consumer Contractual Obligations
(Rome I), U.N. Doc. A6-0450/2007 (Nov. 21, 2007) (prepared by Cristian Dumitrescu).
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id.
96. Rome I Regulation, supra note 3.
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does not permit consumers to select (either intentionally or at the
suggestion of a sophisticated commercial seller) the laws of another
jurisdiction that deprive them of the benefits and protections they
have come to know and expect in the state of habitual residence.
B. Application of Rome I in the Consumer Protection Context
Under the Rome I regulation, consumers are protected by the
application of the laws of their habitual residence so long as the other
party—the “professional” acting in furtherance of a professional
trade—pursued these commercial activities in that consumer’s home
country.97 If a company advertises or holds itself out for business in a
jurisdiction, a consumer who resides in that state is entitled to the
98
protection of those laws. Therefore, Europe has chosen to provide a
basic guarantee to consumers who enter into contracts with
professional sellers. These requirements show that home law
protection is not boundless but is instead based on the expectation of
reasonable corporate and consumer actions. Consumers that contract
within their home jurisdictions are entitled to the protection of those
laws. Similarly, sellers are responsible for complying with the laws of
those states where they advertise or conduct business. Any consumer
contract, therefore, cannot abrogate those protections under
Europe’s choice-of-law analysis. Thus, Rome I has allowed for a more
consistent choice-of-law system for consumer protection in Europe.99
The judicial application of the European approach to consumer
choice shows that it would be a good development for the United
States. European courts have generally considered the mandatory
provisions of the consumer’s home country to apply when the parties
choose a foreign law.100 The German Federal Court invalidated a
credit contract between an Austrian bank and a German customer
101
that was to be governed by Austrian law. The German Federal
Court held that German provisions against doorstop-selling remained
applicable for the German consumer under the rules of the

97. Id. art. 6(1)(a)-(b).
98. Id.
99. See Solomon, supra note 70, at 1719.
100. Jürgen Basedow, Consumer Contracts and Insurance Contracts in a Future Rome I
Regulation, in ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN BRUSSELS I AND ROME I 269, 280 (Johan
Meeusen, Marta Pertegás & Gert Straetmans eds., 2004).
101. Id. (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 26, 1993, IPRspr.,
1993, No. 37, 97).
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predecessor to Article 5(2) in Rome I.102 Since German laws provided
this protection for habitual residents of that country, the court
interpreted those protections as ones that could not be abrogated by a
choice of another state’s law. Another court invalidated a contract
that selected English law to apply to a futures transaction with a
German consumer, since the protection under the British regulations
was considerably lower than the consumer protection under the
103
German laws. In essence, European courts have approached the
rules from the standpoint of protecting consumers with the
protections of their home laws. The European Court of Justice, for
example, has developed a model of consumer protection choice-oflaw in which the “reasonably well informed and reasonable observant
and circumspect consumer” will prevail.104
The European consumer rules also act in conjunction with a
variety of Directives that affect the Community’s choice-of-law
approach. One such Directive, governing distance contracts, notes the
wide variance in protections afforded by different jurisdictions and
articulates a need for a minimum level of common rules that would
protect consumers.105 In addition, the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive states that a contract term that is not individually
negotiated is unfair if it runs contrary to the requirement of good
faith and “causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and
obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the
consumer.”106 These directives are based on the idea that the
confidence of consumers will be strengthened when they expect equal
107
rights and remedies regardless of where the transaction took place.
Thus, the European approach of providing for basic and predictable
rules on which consumers can rely not only protects consumers in the

102. Id. (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 26, 1993, IPRspr.,
1993, No. 37, 97).
103. Id. at 281 (citing Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Trial Court for Criminal Matters]
Dusseldorf, Mar. 8, 1996, IPRspr., 1996, No. 144, 347).
104. Straetmans, supra note 73, at 303 (citing Case C-126/91, Yves Rocher, 1993 E.C.R. I2361).
105. Council Directive 97/7 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance
Contracts, pmbl., 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EU).
106. Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L
095) 29 (EC).
107. See Cristina Poncibò, The Challenge of EC Consumer Law 3 (European Univ. Inst.,
Max Weber Programme Working Paper, MWP No. 2007/24, 2007).
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conduct of modern transactions, but also benefits the market by
108
ensuring greater consumer confidence.
C. Criticisms and Possible Shortcomings of European Approach
Commentators have not been uniformly supportive of Europe’s
choice-of-law approach to consumer protection. Supportive
commentators have observed, for example, that its “practical
approach . . . will lead to the same results [preferred] by academic
writers in most cases, but it has the advantage of speed and low
costs.”109 The critics, however, view European law as granting
excessive protection to consumers and being too liberal with the
110
interpretation of choice-of-law clauses. Consumer contract law
under Rome I might benefit from a more explicit definition of the
consumer concept and also from a limitation that the rules only apply
in business-to-consumer contracts.
Some case law has developed that could suggest the Rome I
consumer protection approach is too precise. The Gran Canaria
Cases, decided in German courts, concerned the marketing strategies
111
employed by a Spanish company at German tourists. The sales
contracts were written in German, for goods to be delivered in
Germany, and the consumers were spoken to in German, but the
transaction was to be governed by the laws of the Isle of Man. At the
time, Spain had not yet implemented some consumer protection
directives.112 The Bundesgerichtshof held that the choice-of-law clause
in these contracts was valid because the contract concerned
113
immovable property, not goods or services. The Gran Canaria Cases
suggest that Rome I is not a perfect fit for all cases, since the
consumers should have been the beneficiaries of their home state
protections. Broader consumer contract rules would have allowed for
their application in this instance.
Despite these shortcomings, European consumer protection
conflicts jurisprudence can still serve as a model for positive
improvements in the American system. American choice of law with

108. See id.
109. Basedow, supra note 100, at 281.
110. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 70, at 1740.
111. Basedow, supra note 100, at 276 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] Mar. 19, 1997, IPRspr., 1997, No. 34).
112. Id. (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 19, 1997, IPRspr.,
1997, No. 34).
113. Id. at 276-77.
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regard to consumer contracts could benefit from a more European
approach by allowing consumers the freedom to contract, qualified by
an important protective measure that would not deprive them of the
laws of their home state. In addition, such a system would have the
added benefit of bringing clarity and consistency to a field of law that
has seen little certainty under the current application of § 187 and the
fundamental public policy analysis.114
III: POSSIBLE REFORM OF AMERICAN CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW IN LIGHT OF EUROPEAN LAW
Based on the European experience, the United States would be
well served to adopt a conflicts regime that applies specifically to
consumer contracts. This proposal would be most effective if it
permitted a limited amount of consumer choice. As such, a new
regime should ensure that consumers could not choose the laws of
another American state or foreign country that would deny them
protections afforded by the state laws of their legal residence. By
doing so, the United States would not only implement the concept
underlying the European approach—encouraging choice but
protecting the weaker party in a consumer transaction—but would
also develop a rule that functions more consistently than the current
fundamental public policy approach.
Also, the new approach should incorporate Rome I’s limitation
that companies must be advertising or otherwise holding themselves
out for business in jurisdictions before consumers can have the
benefits of those laws. In carving out a conflicts approach for one
specific type of contract, it would be important to make sure that the
rule reaches only the types of consumer transactions that require
protection of the weaker party. By limiting its application to
consumer-seller agreements, this approach would learn not only from
the benefits of the European approach but also from its shortcomings.
Thus, adopting a rule in the same basic vein as Rome I that contains
several improvements and limitations would allow the United States
to improve its overall approach to choice of law in the consumer
protection context.
This idea highlights a major difference between the European
and American approaches: consumer contracts in Europe are
evaluated through their own specific category of rules while
American law tends to treat consumer agreements through the
114. See supra Part I.
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traditional choice-of-law approach to contracts. Still, American courts
should provide a degree of protection to consumers by ensuring that a
contractual choice does not derogate from the protections afforded
by the laws of their home state.
Legislators implementing this approach could also learn from the
lessons of a failed attempt to import European concepts to the
American choice-of-law structure in the recent revision of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). While some scholars believe
that the failure of recent modifications to the U.C.C. in the United
States might counsel against an approach based on Rome I and
mandatory norms,115 several of the criticisms of the U.C.C. revision,
including the opposition from commercial interests and the perceived
danger of corporations applying their own law at the expense of
consumers, would be avoided under an approach that more closely
parallels Rome I. As described above, an approach that accounts for
the primary goals of the Rome I regulation—permitting consumer
choice but safeguarding the protections of home state laws—and
implements some limitations on the scope of the rule would offer the
United States a more palatable form of the European approach to
choice of law in consumer contracts.
In revising the choice-of-law provisions of the U.C.C., the
drafters of the proposed modifications looked to the European
116
approach in the Rome Convention. Section 1-105 allowed the
parties to a transaction to select the law of any state that bore a
117
“reasonable relation” to the transaction. In 2001, the drafters sought
to import the European mandatory rule concepts by offering
118
proposed Section 1-301. This new section still allowed parties to
choose any law that bore a “reasonable relationship” to the
transaction119 but had specific rules if one of the parties to the
120
transaction is a consumer. Looking to the Rome Convention, the
drafters of this section required that the application of the chosen law
“not deprive the consumer of the protection of any rule of law . . .
which both is protective of consumers and may not be varied by
agreement,” including the law of the consumer’s home state.121 The
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1657.
See id. at 1656.
U.C.C. § 1-105 (1989).
See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1656.
U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(1).
See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1656.
U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(2).
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influence of the European model on the new revision to the U.C.C. is
clear because the new regulation allowed consumers the freedom to
select the law governing a commercial transaction but prevented them
from derogating from the protections of their home state laws.
However, new Section 1-301 did not enjoy widespread
acceptance. In fact, the new provision “produced almost no positive
results”122 and only the Virgin Islands adopted it in full.123 Twenty-one
state legislatures introduced bills to adopt the new section, but no
bills were adopted.124 Of the fourteen states that adopted a majority of
125
the proposed reforms, each one decided not to adopt Section 1-301.
Patrick Borchers describes this failure of proposed Section 1-301 in
the United States as evidence that America is not receptive to
European rules that exempt consumers from choice-of-law clauses
that derogate from the protections offered by their home states.126 But
the substance of the debate surrounding proposed Section 1-301
shows that its rejection was instead the product of several competing
considerations.
Since proposed Section 1-301 was aimed at consumer protection,
127
it naturally drew criticism from industry groups. In addition,
commercial entities worried that moving away from the “reasonable
relation” approach in favor of consumer-oriented protections would
bring greater complexity to the process of reviewing contracts and
thus add significant costs to consumer transactions.128 Such costs
would be mitigated by a Rome I-type of approach, wherein sellers are
responsible for the laws of the habitual residence of the consumer if
the seller advertises or holds itself out for business in that
129
jurisdiction. At worst, a national company in the United States
would have to ensure that its choice of law would not derogate from
the protections offered to consumers in any of those states.
Complying with the differing state-level regulations in the
consumer protection context is an exercise that large companies
122. See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1656.
123. Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of Revised
U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 59 (2005).
124. Id. at 59-60.
125. Id.
126. See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1657.
127. See Graves, supra note 123, at 61.
128. See, e.g., Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, Proposed
Amendment to UCC Article 1-Section 301: Choice of Law, available at http://www.ucita.com/
Legislation.htm [hereinafter Fair Electronic Commerce].
129. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 6(1)(a)-(b).
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marketing their products in America already undertake. For example,
the German car manufacturer BMW, which markets and sells cars all
across the United States, adopted a policy for all American imports
governing the disclosure of pre-sale repairs to new automobiles that
130
BMW looked to the consumer
incurred damage in transit.
protections laws in each state and decided to set its company policy at
the level of the most stringent jurisdiction, which in this case required
disclosure of repairs which cost more than three percent of the
suggested retail price of the automobile.131 While BMW or any other
national company might incur costs and legal fees in determining the
most stringent consumer requirements with regard to their
transactions, the BMW policy is evidence that such an undertaking is
already a part of the normal course of nationwide business in
America. For companies that target consumers in a multitude of
states, the idea of complying with consumer regulations in those
jurisdictions is hardly a new concept.
A related, but similarly unfounded, concern with proposed
Section 1-301 was the fear that a seller could rely on this provision to
incorporate the protection of the laws of their own jurisdiction into a
contract with a consumer, and thereby impose one state’s laws on
consumers across the country.132 However, such a situation could not
occur under the basic rules of Rome I and this fear misunderstands
Section 1-301. As indicated earlier, such an approach would
specifically prescribe that the selection of a foreign law would not
have the effect of depriving the consumer of any protections offered
by the jurisdiction where the consumer resides. Thus, it would seem
that the commercial seller would be unable, under a Rome I-type
rule, to rely on the protections afforded by its home jurisdiction, and
would instead be bound by the protections afforded to its customer
under that customer’s native laws. Including a more specific
stipulation that only a consumer can rely on these laws or a more

130. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563-65 (1996). This case, decided by
the United States Supreme Court, was a civil fraud action undertaken by a consumer against
BMW for failing to disclose an instance of pre-sale repairs made to a new car. The Supreme
Court’s decision focused on the propriety of punitive damages in such a case and what
constituted a reasonable amount. In their defense at trial and on appeal, BMW described how
they had reviewed the laws of each state and decided to set their policy to comply with the most
stringent set of requirements, thereby ensuring compliance with all state laws applicable to their
American operations.
131. Id. at 565.
132. See Fair Electronic Commerce, supra note 128 (worrying that, under U.C.C. § 1-301, a
consumer might “be forced to have the least favorable law in America apply” to the contract).
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specific definition of consumer would address remaining fears or
misunderstandings about such a provision.
In conclusion, the criticisms that arose regarding Section 1-301
would not constitute an obstacle to a Rome I-type regulation because
they are not systemic problems with the American legal system. In
fact, twenty-one state legislatures at the very least considered
133
adopting this approach before it was withdrawn. This framework
would not impose an unreasonable burden on commercial actors,
since they already confront the issues of fifty-state compliance in
other areas of their businesses, including state administrative and
statutory consumer protection laws. And while business interests
presumably would not be in favor of a consumer-friendly change in
the law, a national-level proposal, resembling Rome I, that addresses
some concerns about the application of the seller’s home-state laws
may receive more support. Thus, the failure to adopt Section 1-301
should not be viewed as an American indictment of any and all
mandatory norms. Rather, the specific proposal simply failed to gain
traction in a national debate about the merits of the undertaking. A
rule that strikes to the heart of the Rome I regulation—ensuring
consumers are protected by the benefits of their home law—would
offer an improvement to the consistency and the substance of the
U.S. choice-of-law approach to consumer contracts.
CONCLUSION
A consistent and reliable approach to consumer protection
choice of law is essential in an increasingly mobile and interconnected
society. Whatever the merits of the current system, consistency is
clearly not among them.134 By adopting an approach similar to that of
Europe, as embodied in Rome I, the United States could take an
important step toward not only protecting consumers and increasing
consumer confidence, but also toward developing a more consistent
application of choice-of-law analysis.
Under Restatement § 187, American courts currently examine
whether the application of a chosen law would violate a fundamental
135
public policy. But American courts have applied this standard
inconsistently, with only some courts offering consumers the

133. See Graves, supra note 123, at 59-60.
134. See supra Part I.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
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protection of the laws of their home jurisdiction.136 Europe’s approach
under Rome I allows consumers the freedom to select an applicable
law, provided that such choice would not constitute a derogation from
the laws that protect them in their home states.137 Though the failed
proposal to amend the U.C.C. in America has influenced some
scholars to counsel against a mandatory norms approach in the
United States, a European type of proposal would not face the same
138
criticism if it incorporated the lessons of Rome I. Looking to Rome
I for guidance on this subject would help the United States simplify
and solidify a more consistent approach to choice-of-law, thereby
encouraging consumer confidence in a rapidly expanding and everchanging global marketplace.

136. See supra Part I.
137. Rome I Regulation, supra note 3, art. 5.
138. See supra Part II.C.

